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flPJEl' OF APPELLl\l'lT 
Case no. 19275 
TlMMY !!ILL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with theft by deception, a second 
degree felony, in violation of UCA §76-6-405, in connection with 
the sale of an imitation controlled substance. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted as charged in a jury trial on April 
28, 1983, in the second Judicial District court, County of Weber, 
State of Utah, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction on the grounds 
as set forth in the following argument. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On Friday, December 10, 1982, pursuant to negotiations with 
several individuals, undercover Detective Jack Alexander of the 
Ogden City Police Department met with Timmy Hill with the intent 
of purchasing one ounce of cocaine for a price of $2,100. Timmy 
mrt w1th Detective Alexander in a parked car, told him that he 
11 1.! 'Tl!' ('u 11 ,·(~ rJ!- 11 qood" (:·ric,:::i.ine ancl then completed the Oeal. 
t 1 ,\11 11 1,1· r J;":S'l~,:1,-1tt·l1 r:-~~1ccc1 Timrny under C\rrest. T.:immy 
It:, ~ ~ l \ -, l: t 1 c111 -or \ J l u 0 of a J t 
-1_J111lc1tinri r~(111tJt':1•1: ,1: \ 1:1r' 
l 11 1 1 :,. 
intormati0n 1 c:·111 Jl'l~ 'l'liri111'. \.'Jtl1 1 l1r '• 
'.oi76-6-405 inst <·all ot pursuing the ,~11,i, ,,, 111 '" 1 
Counsel for defendant resisted this amendment, and "I' lic1 1 • h ;, 
1983, moved the District Court of Weber County to dismiss 0 n 
basis that Timmy was improperly charged. The court denied 
defendant's motion and Timmy was tried and convicted for 
violation of UCA §76-6-405. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS IMPROPERLY CHARGED UNDER A 
GENERAL THEFT STATUTE OF THEFT BY DECEPTION 
(UCA §76-6-405), WHEN A SPECIFIC DRUG 
STATUTE (UCA §58-37b-4) WOULD BE MORE APPLICABLE 
AND DIRECTLY CONTROLLING. 
The Legislature has specifically provided that provisions 
the Controlled Substances Act be controlling over conflicting 
provision of other state laws. UCA §58-37-19 provides in 
relevant part: 
"Whenever the requirements prescribed, the 
offenses defined or the penalties imposed 
relating to substances controlled by this 
act shall be or appear to be in conflict 
with Title 58, Chapter 17 or any other laws 
of this state, the provisions of this act 
shall be controlling." 
Any offense that is clearly included within the Cont1·rl:·' 
Substances Act, would the ref ore be qove r necl li'/ t t1c1 t Al'! , 
'< 1-·llt ! 1 tdh '.;uprr-n'.c Cnurt d~cision of State v. Hicken 
1 j !i ;t-; (lit dh l <Jt) -~), ri.i'.->r:u:--_;ses thi:; i:;suc and should gov<=rn 
I :1• ',,\1r1~- 1ul1nq ir1 this cas~. In that case, the defendant 
11 r 'll'J<!U a :,cilc of mar1JUana. He was charged, however, with 
d1~tribution for value in conjunction with UCA 1953 §76-2-202, by 
intentionally aiding another person to engage in that criminal 
conduct. The defendant's argument was that UCA §58-37-8(1) (a) 
(iv), arranging the sale of a controlled substance, spoke 
directly and specifically to the defendant's conduct and would be 
the proper statute under which the defendant should be charged. 
In holding that §76-2-202 did not apply, this Court asserted 
persuasively that the Controlled Substances Act exclusively 
governed conduct included within its parameters. 
The question to be decided by this Court is whether UCA 
§58-37-19 would be applicable to a later enacted chapter of the 
Controlled Substances Act that of Title 58, Chapter 37(b), 
entitled the "Imitation Controlled Substances Act." 
The logical application of §58-37-19 to Chapter 37(b), is 
indicated by several factors. First, §58-37b was enacted for the 
purpose of clarifying and specifying in some detail what would be 
considered an imitation controlled substance and to set a penalty 
for selling, distributing or manufacturing such substances for 
the purpose of substituting them for real controlled substances. 
'1'111' important fact in determining whether the "Imitation 
',,r,l 1111 \c'd Substcl!WC'.' ilct" should be included as a controlling 
'11• \ ''.1llil.l,'tJ.r~~ c_,! simultaneous statutes as specified in 
Til1 :; 
replaced by §58-37b was clca1_-1y JncJud('d dS contrcJl11iH· 
general criminal statute. 
then is also controlling. 
It is logical to assume that §58-J 
Second, the "Imitation Controlled Substances Act" is 
extremely brief and refers to the Controlled Substances Act for 
its major definition. It contains none of the procedural 
sections that are contained in the parent statute which further 
implies that one should refer to §58-37 provisions. 
Finally, the legislature inserted the "Imitation Controlle,, 
Substances Act" as §58-37b making it a sub-chapter to chapter J: 
the Controlled Substances Act. 
Other considerations should likewise be examined in 
determining whether an offense should be prosecuted under Chapte: 
37 (b) or the more general Criminal Code. In Helmath v. Morns, 
598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979), this Court expressed its adherence~ 
the common principle that when an individuals' conduct can be 
construed to be a violation of two conflicting statutes, the more 
specific statute will control over the more general. 
Additionally, the Court declared "that where two statutes 
interdict the same conduct, but impose different penalties, t~ 
violator is entitled to the lessor punishment." Id at 33s 
also State\'. Shondel, 451 P.:'d 146 (l:T 19f,'J); l'co~~--':dl,. 
4 (, 2 p. ~ b (; tCz1 l l ':J l•(,. l 
,\ ! i11t11 1 Cl\'tor wh1 ch tliis Court should consider is the 
t _1Lr_''., prc~cr:dcnce over an earlier enacted statute. 
The scope ot the Im1tat1on Controlled Substances Act by 
<;tatutory language universally governs all conduct involving 
imitation controlled substances. UCA §58-37b-4 in relevant part 
states: "It is unlawful for any person to manufacture, 
distribute, or possess with intent to distribute, an imitation 
controlled substance." The Act does not directly speak to the 
issue of whether or not the transacting individuals have 
knowledge of the fact that it is imitation substance or not. In 
defining imitation controlled substance, the statute states, 
"Imitation controlled substance means a 
substance that is not a controlled substance, 
which by overall dosage unit substantially 
resembles a specific controlled substance 
in appearance (such as color, shape, size, 
and markings), or by representation made, 
would cause a reasonable person to believe 
that the substance is a controlled 
substance." (UCA §58-37b-2 (4), emphasis added.) 
By enacting this statute, the Legislature doubtless was 
aware that it would be used not only in charging individuals who 
sold an imitation controlled substance to a buyer who knew or was 
told of its false nature, but also in charging individuals who 
sold imitation substances to unknowing buyers with the intent to 
deceptively steal their money. 
The facts of the case on appeal present the Court with 
•_1rcumstanccs that would clearly fall within the intended scope 
The cJefrndar>t sole. lo an underrnver agent iJ 
,\Jli: ~.:!~(:( w'lll('I, 111 ~-:ti[-·L ,1t-,1rr-(' 'l!l-:.~::..tdntlc.1lJ_~: r0SC'mblf~'d •,'C1co.1ne. 
The defendant represented to thc:c ac;,·111 1:L1t 11,. 
cocaine. The defe1Ldon+ clearly d.1'. lr1L•utl'(: ,jf' 1n11 1-
controlled substance as clefined li\· ,-L,tu1 '" 
conduct may well be a violation oi the more yeneral t 11·: t 1. 
deception statute §76-6-405 in that the defendant obtained 
control over the agents money by deception. The gravamen of th, 
defendant's appeal, however, is that his conduct is more 
specifically defined and proscribed by UCA §58-37b-4, that th~ 
statute is controlling, and therefore the defendant was 
improperly charged under the more general and non-controlling 
Criminal Code. The strength of appellant's contention that hls 
conduct should be governed by the controlled substances act is 
further substantiated by the fact that the prosecution, 
initially charged the defendant with distribution of an imitat1m 
controlled substance under UCA §58-37b-4, only to amend the 
charge at a later point in time. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the 
charge against defendant from a violation of the Imitation 
Controlled Substances Act to a second degree felony, theft by 
deception. That the trial court further violated defendant's 
rights to due process and equal protection by allowing the State 
to proceed to trial and gain a conviction over the proper and 
timely objection of defense counsel. That the Imitation 
Controlled Substances Act is to be cons1cl<'i-r'n under 111 '1' 
-)-
fn addition, prior decisions by this court requires that the 
J,·tendcJr:t is entitled to be charged with that statute which most 
·,;f"''·1f1cally proscribes the defendant's conduct or when the 
·,tatcs are equally specific the defendant is entitled to the 
benefit of the statute carrying the less sever penalty. 
Therefore, the appellant respectfully prays that this court 
reverse his conviction and remand the matter for trial under the 
lmitotioo Contcolled Subotooceo A~~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~I 1983. 
Attorneys for Appellant gratefully acknowledge the 
assistance of Randall Richards, third year law student at the 
University of Utah, in the preparation of this brief. 
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